Category Archives: Research

Insiders vs. Outsiders: Why Raj Rajaratnam is no Martha Stewart

Martha Stewart was a billionaire in 2001.  She floated her own media firm, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, on the New York Stock Exchange in 1999 and witnessed her stock price double just on the first day it began trading.  Her T.V. shows combined with magazines and a home furnishing line were just hitting their stride.  She was the queen and dominated the smart, simple and fresh themes that she presented in her suggestions for lifestyle, cooking, and organization.

Unfortunately, calamity stuck and Stewart went from champ to chump literally over night.  According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in late 2001, Stewart, upon receiving a tip from her broker from Merrill Lynch, Peter Bacanovic, decided to sell her holdings in biotech firm, ImClone.  An assistant to Mr. Bacanovic, forever known as Martha Stewart’s broker, told Ms. Stewart that ImClone’s CEO, Sam Waksal, was selling all his shares in advance of a report from the Food and Drug Administration that would severely impact ImClone’s stock.  She sold, avoiding a loss of $45, 673.

In 2003, Stewart was indicted on a variety of charges including securities fraud and obstruction of justice.  She was ultimately found guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of an agency proceeding and making false statements to federal investigators.  She was sentenced in July 2004 to serve a five month term in a federal correctional facility after which she was released to home confinement for another five months and required to wear an ankle bracelet.

In similar fashion, we’ve just uncovered the largest case of insider trading in the post-Madoff world.  The Galleon Group, run by famed hedge fund trader, Raj Rajaratnam, knocked out 25% yearly returns like butter.  From inception in 1992 until this year, Galleon returned almost 3000% cumulatively. Rajaratnam, a billionaire himself, built his empire on what seemed to be an intimate knowledge of the technology industry.  This deep knowledge of the sector allowed Galleon to gain an edge on the market as it seemed to know where tech stocks were headed.  As Galleon grew assets and its fame, investors put almost $3 billion into the fund to be steered by Rajaratnam.

Rajaratnam’s industry expertise made him the envy of his peers.  His contacts were unrivaled and the research that Galleon’s analyst did on the industry shamed investment bank analysts.  Galleon clients were provided with the top industry analysis — a veritable treatise — on a quarterly basis that mapped out how Raj and his team saw stocks moving.  While he dabbled in other industries, Galleon’s success was predicated on the firm’s vertical expertise in high tech, including semiconductor, computer hardware, and Internet stocks.

It turns out that Galleon’s ability to achieve outsized returns wasn’t completely fair.  According to one regulator, it appears that Galleon was extremely adept at making money off of insider information: “Deliberate and systematic use of inside information to inform his trading decisions was for all practical purposes [Galleon founder Raj Rajaratnam’s business model.” Apparently, the SEC had uncovered an intricate web of accomplices and industry contacts that fed Galleon valuable, secret information for years.  For Galleon, it meant easy money.  By soliciting high-level executives to become investors in Galleon, Rajaratnam created a mobile insider army which had access to secret data at all levels of global organizations.

Former WSJ publisher Gordon Crovitz has an interesting piece on the WSJ today arguing that unlike what befell Stewart, Galleon’s methods shouldn’t be outlawed.  Whereas Stewart received inside information transforming her to insider status, Crovitz makes a distinction regarding the investment analyst’s role:

Instead, the Galleon case is about what might be called “outsider trading”—trading by people who gathered information from insiders about company performance or operations, not trading by the insiders themselves.

He argues that efficient markets require information free information transfer between parties and any regulatory effort to crimp analysts’ work would result in more instances of mispricings, not less.  As Milton Friedman once quipped, “you should want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make the public aware of that.”

Regardless of the differences between the Stewart and Galleon cases, investors should recognize that they themselves have the tools and power to track the moves of corporate insiders.  Insiders have been shown to make market-beating profits by trading legally in their own stocks.

University of Michigan’s Seyhoun has written the definitive book on the matter, Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading (that’s an Amazon link where I get paid a nominal fee if you decide to purchase via this link).  In this book, Seyhoun systematically studies how well different sets of insiders trade and devises strategies to profit by piggybacking on their moves.  I recommend the book and understand how powerful this could be for individual investors.  He credits corporate management’s ability to beat the market due to an informational advantage executives have over the rest of us: even if they aren’t trading on inside information, company employees do have a damn good view of their businesses and industry.

It turns out (read the book) that multiple insiders at small cap firms trading in large share counts profit the most.  Premium sites like GuruFocus and InsiderScore make it very easy for investor to launch a totally legal insider trading strategy.  Like AlphaClone assists us in tracking guru hedge fund investors and their every moves, sites like these enable us to identify and track the best insiders to profit alongside them.

Stewart and Galleon may be two prominent cases where powerful insiders abused their access to valuable information.  As individual investors, we don’t really need insider access — we can profit by tracking and mimicking their moves.


With BusinessWeek, Bloomberg takes aim at Dow Jones

Everyone’s out reporting that Bloomberg, after being rumored as a suitor to pick up trouble biz mag, BusinessWeek, actually closed the deal for a rumored $5 million, an assumption of debt that amounts to over $30 million and a burn-rate of over $800,000/week.businessweek-magazine

Couple of salient points here:

  • Integration issues: Bloomberg has grown with a “build, not buy” mentality.  It will be interesting to see how Bloomberg, the company, reacts to assuming legacy employees from a very traditional publishing house, McGraw-Hill (MHP).
  • Web presence: I’ve always felt that one of the most under-monetized financial assets online was Bloomberg.com.  The content is just, hands down, some of the best anywhere.  It’s global.  It’s fresh.  It’s relevant.  And it’s free!  Great for us, but what the heck is Bloomberg thinking here?  With some creativity, Bloomberg could do a lot better here with its skeleton web crew.  BusinessWeek’s experience dealing with monetizing web presence could be invaluable here.  I also like the networking capabilities BW has been developing in its Business Exchange.
  • Magazine Ops: While Bloomberg does product a print product, Bloomberg Markets, it’s a monthly.  I’m familiar with the product because it was traditional thrown into a terminal subscription.  It’s gotten better over the years but it’s still geared for those who actually use Bloomberg Terminals and doesn’t do a great job as a stand-alone publication.   Running a weekly will require some tweaking.
  • Revenue Models: I don’t know if Bloomberg’s existing magazine is profitable but it didn’t really need to be.  It was a sticky service to Bloomberg subscribers.  BusinessWeek, on the other hand, used to provide pretty stable revenues off an advertising model.  Is Bloomberg going to beef up its ad sales group?  Or, will Bloomberg try to use BusinessWeek to drive more terminal subs.  BusinessWeek seems to think that this is possible — I’m not convinced that businesses will pony up $1800/month for terminals if they’re not in the securities industry.  Maybe Bloomberg is coming with a more-mainstream business product?
  • Competitiveness: With a pure business product (and one that leverages the web better than Bloomberg.com does), Bloomberg becomes a lot more competitive vs. a Dow Jones.  I won’t be the first to admit that Dow Jones internet properties have lost some of their luster over the past 2 years and haven’t stayed as fresh or relevant as they did historically.  Plus, as part of a larger News Corp organization, Dow Jones strategy becomes totally intertwined with that of the larger org.  Bloomberg may turn out to be more nimble here.

Additional Resources:


Brand as driver of stock price

As investors, we sometimes get too fixed on trying to find financial metrics that provide some level of predictability to stock price movement.  A recent study shows that low price/sales and price/earnings ratios aren’t the only thing we should be looking at.

brandzThe BrandZ portfolio, developed by leading public relations firm, WPP’s Millward Brown Optimor, has spanked the S&P500 during this last doozy of a market.  Makes sense, too, that a portfolio of the most valuable brands in the world (large caps like Google, Apple, Intel) perform better than the market during a major downturn.

According to the TechCrunch article:

The BrandZ study, commissioned by Millward Brown Optimor owner WPP , measures the brand equity of thousands of global “consumer facing” and B2B brands, and including over 1 million consumers from more than 20 countries. The ranking is calculated using a methodology called “Economic Use”, taking into account the role that brands play in purchase decisions and identifying what proportion of the business value can be attributed purely to the brand. Besides inputs from the BrandZ study, the ranking uses financial data from Bloomberg and market and product data from Datamonitor. The ranking takes into account regional variations since even for truly global brands measures of brand contribution might differ substantially across countries.

Maybe firms should spend more time and focus bolstering their brands than on propping up their stock prices.

Hat tip to TechCrunch.


Can Bloomberg save the newspaper industry?

We’re not talking about Mayor Bloomberg here, but rather the mutibillion dollar financial media empire he founded.  While there are a lot of alternatives for traders these days, including CapitalIQ and Reuters, most traders still use the ubiquitous Bloomberg terminal as the interface between trading and research.

lifeguardFor the unacquainted, Bloomberg terminals are the defacto research platform for traders and asset managers.  Financial institutions pay almost $2k per terminal per month for access to Bloomberg.  Once inside, a trader or researcher has access to most of the information and data on the planet.  Bloomberg provides a lot of information as part of their basic service.  Many trading platforms plug directly into Bloomberg so that traders can go from research, to financial modeling, to trading and reconciliation — all on the same machine and interface.

Lot of basic data included

Much of this functionality, like basic data on equities, fixed income, and market news come built-in.  So, too, basic portfolio analytics and risk tools.  But being the financial world’s most powerful aggregator, many other 3rd party services are available for delivery via Bloomberg for additional fees.  These can include everything from First Call, a service that aggregates sell-side research, to foreign exchange price discovery and trading.

Additional 3rd party revenue opportunities

Bloomberg charges a lot for its basic service and then provides a gateway service for investors and 3rd party data and service providers through the firm’s terminals.  When I wrote about the online brokers developing App Store like platforms, allowing 3rd parties to sell through and reach their account holders on their platforms, Bloomberg actually was the model for this.

Bloomberg, as a financial information platform, provides a necessary structure to the news, data and information industry for investors.  I previously established the 4 roles platforms play in the financial space:

  1. Aggregate content: investors don’t have to hunt down information by doing hundreds of Boolean searches on the Internet.  By serving as content aggregators, Bloomberg serves as a clearing house and central node to access all types of information and services.
  2. Establish an orderly market: Platforms create order by creating certain standards for their products and partners.  Bloomberg has established syndication guidelines via which partners must comply to be on the platform.
  3. Create viable business models: It’s not clear to me that many investment research products could survive on a standalone basis.  Investors don’t like to pay for content and by aggregating numerous sources on a single site, Bloomberg actually creates a viable business model for its partners and shares it out with them.
  4. Consolidates usage to make single a jumpoff point to reach users: By consolidating the market, making it orderly and putting viable financial metrics behind it, Bloomberg is the gateway to users.  It’s too hard, complicated and expensive to reach investors directly.  Bloomberg acts as a market maker for investment content bringing suppliers and consumers of content together.

So, it’s interesting to read that PaidContent.org has uncovered that the New York Times is selling a real-time feed of its content via Bloomberg.  Of course, most of us can access a free, almost-real time RSS feed of the NYT’s content using a basic feed reader, PaidContent says that this is the first time the paper has licensed a real-time feed.

What does this mean?  It means that Bloomberg recognizes that traders value, in fact put a premium on, real-time news.  Being able to read a breaking story on your Bloomberg terminal before the rest of the investment public has been pushed the story is valuable.  The New York Times, as it wrestles with trying to find a viable business model, understands this as well.  One revenue course that many of the leading financial content providers might take is to follow in the NYT’s footsteps and in fact, create a tiered subscription model where those who value the real-time-ness of news pay for it while the rest of us shlubs read it online after an embargo.

Now, it’s unclear exactly how much the NYT would see from this but it’s another channel and one that can find an audience willing to pay up for valuable, actionable content.

Content stays free and what subscribers pay for is delivery.  Not so different from the old model of newspaper print — just updated for today’s financial investor.


A Future Of On-Line Finance – From Brokers To Blogs To Yahoo

Today’s post is a guest post from Valuecruncher, a stock picking  service that analyzes individual stocks via discounted cash flow analysis.  We also like the accompanying blog which highlights the site’s methodology and applies it to specific stocks.  You can read more about the methodology here and how it works in practice.

This guest post, in particular, should interest New Rules readers as it examines a lot of the dynamics playing into the changes we regularly describe on these pages.

**********************************

We have been participants and observers of the on-line finance  space for a period of time now. As part of that we regularly examine our view of the competitive landscape. We have decided to share some of our views on where the very broad industry may be headed. This isn’t company specific – very much the high-level perspective.

Where We Are Today

onlinefinance

We view the on-line finance space in three broad areas: Information, Analysis and Execution.

Pre-1995 this whole area was dominated by brokerage firms with full-service offerings. They had the information, did the analysis and the executed the trades. Since 1995 that has changed pretty significantly.

Information – background operational and financial information. The main players in this space are now the large finance portals (Yahoo, AOL, MSN, Google, etc). They built and extended these offerings in the Web 1.0 and 2.0 days. The business model is primarily advertising – free to consumers. It should also be noted that there is still a paid market for detailed and timely financial information (Reuters, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, etc).

Analysis – what does the information mean? Should I buy a particular stock? What is this stock worth? Full-service brokers still compile research notes and reports for clients – but this space has begun to be disrupted. This disruption is coming from a number of areas:

Qualitative – primarily finance blogs. These take two main forms: user-generated content aggregators (i.e. SeekingAlpha) and traditional journalism on the web (i.e. The Business Insider).

Community Sites – where retail investors look to communities of investors for advice on where to invest. Examples: The Motley Fool, Wikinvest, Covestor, KaChing, etc.

Niche Tool Providers – primarily quantitative-based tools. For example Valuecruncher.

Execution – the actual buying and selling of stocks. The discount brokers have come to dominate this space (i.e. Charles Schwab, ETrade, etc). They disrupted full-service brokers with simple flat-rate commission structures starting in the Web 1.0 days.

That is a high-level view of where we are today. What might happen next?

We completed a scenario planning exercise based on the frameworks developed by people like Peter Schwartz.

We started with an analysis of trends and uncertainties. A trend is something that we feel certain is occurring. An uncertainty is something that could still go either way.

Trends

  1. Execution becomes a commodity – executing trades will continue as a low-cost business. There will be some geographic-based regulatory moats – but no ability to generate abnormal returns. Other parties could enter this market (i.e. portals).
  2. Death of traditional equity research – the current model is too expensive and producing research reports that are complex and hard for retail investors to consume. Traditional equity research will head the way of newspapers. Equity research is important but the delivery methods must change. There will be a space at the top-end for high-quality  research (that clients will pay for) but only a niche.
  3. Investor knowledge continues to improve – the level of general investor knowledge continues to improve but there still remains a significant gap between the average retail investor and the corporate finance professional.
  4. Financial blogs continue to be influential – high-quality analysis continues from blogs. There are two broad models – aggregating content (i.e. SeekingAlpha) and traditional journalism on the web (i.e. The Business Insider).

Uncertainties

  1. Individual VS Collaborative – how will retail investors choose to research investment decisions? Individual analysis – retail investors (with improving education) complete their own analysis on where to invest – both qualitative and quantitative. Collaborative – retail investors look to communities of investors for advice on where to invest – track record is vital.
  2. Free VS Paid – financial information has proven to be an isolated area on-line where paid models have worked (i.e. WSJ). Moving forward – will retail investors be prepared to pay for financial information or will free win out?

We then construct a basic scenario matrix. These scenarios are not meant to reflect concrete versions of possible future states but rather to illustrate the potential impact of the identified trends and uncertainties. There will be components of all of the scenarios in the future – this analysis is intended to emphasize trends and uncertainties. We look at the winners in each scenario and where the portals come out.

onlinefinance_matrix

Scenarios

  1. We Live In Public – Retail investors seek advice from communities of other investors. Track record is vital – this is open to abuse. Retail investors won’t pay for this advice. Community owners seek models to monetize the audience not the content – none is initially obvious beyond advertising. WinnersThe Motley Fool, StockTwits. Portals – business as usual providing (mostly) raw data.
  2. Rock Stars – Retail investors seek advice from communities of other investors and are willing to pay. Investors make their trading accounts transparent on-line. Successful investors open their accounts to act as virtual fund managers. Virtual fund managers and community owners split a management fee paid by investors. WinnersCovestor, KaChing. Portals – business as usual providing (mostly) raw data.
  3. Super Commons – Retail investors value analysis and tools but are not willing to directly pay. There is a move from traditional on-line financial information providers (i.e. Capital IQ) to low-cost/no-cost providers (i.e. financial portals). Retail investors and corporate finance professionals use the same tools. New tools are added (i.e. Google Domestic Trends). Pay-walls come down – financial blogs are at their most influential. Winners – Portals and financial blogs
  4. Walled Garden – Retail investors value analysis and tools. The financial blogs continue to exert influence. However the pay-wall remains at the WSJ and on-line information providers (Reuters, Capital IQ) have a valuable and growing business. WinnersReuters, Bloomberg, Capital IQ. Portals – Opportunity to launch a low-cost disruption strategy aimed at on-line information providers (a good enough offering to tempt [for example] Capital IQ’s clients).

Implications

  • Discount Brokers – Challenged across all scenarios. Must follow a low-cost strategy and only add services if that will increase trades (and commissions).
  • Financial Blogs – Winners across all scenarios (a role to play in all scenarios). Two distinct approaches – aggregating content VS traditional journalism on the web. We would expect one to come to the forefront (our bet would be on aggregating content – but it is too early to say).
  • Community Sites – Winners in the “We Live In Public” and “Rock Stars” scenarios. Significant opportunity if community is the way that people choose to make investment decisions. A business model has proven to be a challenge to date for players like the Motley Fool (“We Live In Public” scenario). It is more obvious if investors will pay to be part of the community (“Rock Stars” scenario) – this is currently unproven however.
  • Paid Finance Services – Business as usual in the “Walled Garden” scenario and challenged across all other scenarios. Even in the “Walled Garden” scenario there is the potential for the paid financial services to be disrupted (low-cost disruption) by the portals offering extended services (i.e. Google Domestic Trends). Currently users of paid services also use the free portal services (Yahoo Finance and Google Finance). There are limited options to defend this. Paid services do provide the data used by the finance portals. Reuters are also moving into the free space.
  • On-Line Finance Portals – Winners across all other scenarios. In the “We Live In Public” and “Rock Stars” scenarios – it is closest to business as usual. These players are the ones with the ability to acquire or build community sites. Investors that are part of communities still require basic financial information and tools. In the “Super Commons” and “Walled Garden” scenarios there are big opportunities. Both require adding analysis tools. Partnering with financial blogs is key. Adding analysis tools is an arms race between the different finance portals.

This is one view of the potential future. Tell us what you think.

Valuecruncher Future Of On-Line Finance Summary (Four-page PDF summary).


Can short-term governance focus investors on the long term?

Warren Buffett has been quoted as saying that his ideal holding period for a security is “forever”.  While Buffett has exhibited long-term perseverance with some of his large cap holdings like Johnson and Johnson and Coca-Cola, he’s actually proved to be quite the trader recently with some options plays and short-term funding of the troubled finance industry, pocketing billions of dollars in profits.  In spite of his opportunism, Buffett still has his eyes on the long term prize.  So, when he and cohort, John Bogle, founder of Vanguard Funds and leading proponent of passive index investing, appended their names to a recent report from the Aspen Institute, investors shouldn’t be surprised.

An article in the WSJ profiled the Aspen Institute’s most recent report which you can read in its entirety here (.pdf).  The WSJ’s Justin Lahart reports in “An End to the Focus on Short Term Urged” that the elite Aspen Institute’s report is pretty clear in its characterization of the short-termism that pervades both Wall Street and corporate America.

Investors, corporate boards and managers’ focus on short-term gain has become so detrimental to the economy that unless they voluntarily change their behavior, regulators should step in.

Those are pretty strong words for proponents of the free market like Buffett and Co.  The report details that this short-term focus has become so ingrained in our society that we may need to turn to regulation to change our mindsets and behaviors.  As all investors know, the quarterly earnings cycle ticks like clockwork and we seem to repeat history over and over again every three months.

Lahart describes the symptoms of this disease of myopia:

In 1990, for example, the average holding period of a stock trading on the New York Stock Exchange was 26 months; now it’s less than nine months. At the same time, companies have become more focused on the short term as well, with managers concentrating on hitting near-term targets, such as analysts’ quarterly earnings estimates, and as a result often forgoing measures that promote long-term growth, such as research and development — or even routine maintenance.

Assuming we buy the reports assertion that long term thinking and investing is better for the markets and society (I’m not necessarily convinced), how does the Aspen Institute believe that we can change?  Well, for starters, the Aspen Institute believes that its suggestions will fall on open ears with an activist Obama administration clearly on the prowl for structural change.

The report focuses on three distinct avenues:

  1. Changing long term incentives by skewing capital gains tax further in favor of long term holdings
  2. Encouragement of the Obama administration’s current direction for establishing clear fiduciary duties for advisers as well as for broker/dealers
  3. Build greater transparency into the whole system by strengthening investor disclosures

Will it work?  I don’t know but I’m skeptical.  I find it hard to believe that the American system, from the government on down, can make such a sea-change of a move.  Administrations, especially such a young, aggressive one like President Obama’s, flip-flop on policy and direction all the time only to be replaced every four years.  Cars, computers, and even marriages have become disposable.  Me-first consumerism has been perfected.

It could be that with carnage associated with the 2008 stock market, investors, and Americans, in general, are retreating back to basics.  If so, longer term holdings may just be part of the game plan anyway.  Some older investors burned by last year’s market are holding long-and-strong, convinced that the market will prove their holdings right of the long term.

Leading financial blogger Manual of Ideas likes the ideas floated by the Aspen Institute’s report and says they are long overdue.  But he’s suspect of an overhaul of an already onerous, complex tax code.

The extremely complex United States federal tax code already differentiates between short and long term capital gains by imposing a much lower 15% rate on capital gains realized from securities held for over one year while gains on assets held for shorter periods are taxed as ordinary income at much higher rates.  Adding a third tier into the mix would complicate the tax code to some extent.  However, the attraction of a very low rate (maybe 5 to 10%) on “super long term” capital gains has obvious appeal for “buy and hold” investors.

Additional Resources


The Dichotomy Between Social Networks and Education


Einstein Chalkboard: Source

Recently, I discussed the validity of whether or not social networking (the verb) and social networks (as a noun) were impairing our ability to learn. A Stanford study suggested that this might be the case.

It seems that the initial research and its supporting data is now emerging to help us further analyze whether or not this is indeed true or merely hypotheses based on the various samplings of individuals who may or may not serve as relevant subjects.

I do believe that we are becoming an increasingly social society. It could very well be the era of introversion to extroversion. With this evolution and transformation, we’re concurrently subject to a greater set of distractions. And as such, we are sidetracked by choice and free will. But, as this is the dawn of the great attention economy, and new tools such as PeopleBrowsr, Seesmic, CoTweet, Facebook, and TweetDeck become our attention dashboards, those of us active in the real-time Web must experience an evaporation of attention span and our ability to digest and respond to everything that moves us.

I call this the Attention Rubicon, the acceptance that our appetite for information has passed the point of no return. And, therefore we must concentrate energies on innovation and inventiveness, technologically and psychologically, to effectively process and parse data and in turn shift its momentum behind our online persona to earn equity online and offline. Embracing this Attention Rubicon and investing in our ability to learn, share, and contribute is how we will thrive in today’s attention economy.

If Social Media is a milestone in the evolution of literacy, is the evaporation of attention a form of regression? Or is it possible that that not everything faces a dichotomy?

The cultures and behavior that define each social network and ensuing activity is not only unique across the social Web, its affects and impacts our interaction within each as well as our interaction IRL (in real life).

Linda Stone offers a solution to this dilemma and she refers to it as Continuous Partial Attention.

Continuous partial attention describes how many of us use our attention today. It is different from multi-tasking. The two are differentiated by the impulse that motivates them. When we multi-task, we are motivated by a desire to be more productive and more efficient. We’re often doing things that are automatic, that require very little cognitive processing. We give the same priority to much of what we do when we multi-task — we file and copy papers, talk on the phone, eat lunch — we get as many things done at one time as we possibly can in order to make more time for ourselves and in order to be more efficient and more productive.

To pay continuous partial attention is to pay partial attention — CONTINUOUSLY. It is motivated by a desire to be a LIVE node on the network.

According to new research conducted by psychologist Dr. Tracy Alloway at the University of Stirling in Scotland, we’re not only facing an increasingly thinning state of focus and awareness, we’re either enhancing intelligence or actually diminishing it based on the networks in which we participate. And her findings just might surprise you…

Dr. Alloway is an expert in working memory, the ability both to remember information and to use it.and she believes that it is far more important to success and happiness than our IQ.  Working memory involves the ability both to remember information and to use it. While her research included games as well as social networks, her discovery ultimately positions Facebook and Twitter on opposite axis.

Playing strategy games and solving Sudoku offers the same effect as engaging in Facebook according to Dr. Alloway and thus strengthens working memory. Whereas instant, rapid-fire services such as Twitter weaken it. In an interview with the Telegraph, Dr. Alloway warned, ‘Your attention span is being reduced and you’re not engaging your brain and improving nerve connections.”

In Facebook users manage past activity and in turn map next steps and future actions, which exercises working memory. On the contrary, Twitter and YouTube and other real-time activity streams and networks impede  working memory and therefore hinder our ability to retain relevant insight and knowledge

In the Telegraph, Dr. Alloway observed, ”On Twitter you receive an endless stream of information, but it’s also very succinct. You don’t have to process that information.”

Whether its intentional or merely a by product of innovation, Twitter and Facebook are indeed on a collision course as each vie for not only your attention, but also to host your Social OS, relevant applications, and your social graph. Our attention is many incredible and wonderful things that allow us to observe, learn, appreciate, and respond. What it is not however, is endlessly scalable.

Connect with Brian Solis on:
Twitter
, FriendFeed, LinkedIn, Tumblr, Plaxo, Plurk, Identi.ca, BackType, Posterous, or Facebook


Kindle users, subscribe to PR 2.0 here.

New book and Conversation Prism poster now available (click below to purchase):


Interview with John Schroy, thought leader in collaborative investment research (Part 2)

This is the second part of a two part series where I interview John Schroy, author of Capital Flow Analysis and the founder of Capital Markets Wiki. From the takeaways from our discussions, it’s clear John has put a lot of thought and analysis into thinking about collaborative, crowdsourced investment research.  Just wanted to start the discussion.  I’d love to hear from others who are focused on this space.  Interested readers can find Part I here.

Can you describe CMW, its genesis, any usage statistics/anecdotes that provide some color? What’s the future for the site?

John Schroy: CMW is a “semantic wiki” organized around a strict informational structure called “Capital Market Taxonomy”. It was opened to the public in March 2009, without promotion, and has few editors at this time. However, it has a robust policy base and extensive documentation of its taxonomy.

Today, it has 2,136 articles in the main encyclopedia, almost all of which are “stubs” but which serve to demonstrate the “semantic” features of the site.

The advantage of a “semantic wiki” is that it is possible to quickly select articles based on highly specific criteria, such as “a list of all derivatives settled in dollars or euros relative to soybeans, wheat, or corn” with a linked table showing contract terms, the market where traded, and other data.

On opening the wiki to the public, I found that people were having a hard time understanding the purpose. This led to a complete revamping of the front pages and help sections.

Two months ago, my daughter, who is a portfolio administrator, offered to try to set up an article and found this difficult to do. Again, it was back to the drawing board and an “easy setup” feature was added.

In mid 2008, I made a pre-launch presentation to a group of financial consultants in Southeast Asia, which resulted in creating special templates for the use of college professors.

Issues regarding a more appropriate server for the wiki are still being resolved.

The future of this wiki is expected to depend upon the willingness of university professors to use it as a teaching tool for open source financial research. With this as a basis, it is hoped that the “tipping point” will be reached, with enough articles and editors that the wiki will grow on its own.

Once this point is passed, it is expected that institutional sponsors will support a non-profit foundation, providing the modest funding needed to cover server expenses as the wiki grows.

In order to ensure impartiality and lack of bias, there is no intent to admit advertising to the wiki, nor to allow any institution to dominate the supporting non-profit foundation.

In a recent article on Buffett in The Atlantic, What Would Warren Do?, the reporter cited that so much free information has taken away the value investor’s advantage. In your article opportunities in OSINT, you mention that this free open source information is largely unexploited. Can you explain and do you think more info/data makes it harder to outperform?

JS: Although there is an abundance of “free” information on the Internet — more than anyone can hope to digest in a lifetime — this information has a “time cost” to turn it into investment intelligence. Only a tiny portion of this information is published in Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Capital Markets have become complex and most information is “buried” in official documents, covered with boilerplate, disclaimers, and useless “fluff”.

For example, the closed-end fund NRO was rated five stars by Morningstar and its preferred shares were given an AAA rating by Moody’s, but the “toxic” features of its preferred shares were not revealed in its annual reports to shareholders and the fund was not even reported by Standard & Poors. Like similar funds, it fell dramatically with the Crash of 2008. I did a research article in CMW on this issue and it took 75 hours to dig out the relevant facts ( I could have expended ten times this effort in finding out all that was available about this relatively simple company.)

The Crash of 2008 showed that the market is far from efficient and that the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” is nonsense. Billions are invested in “index funds” without any research at all. The information base available to Benjamin Graham was tiny compared to the tsunami of free information available today. However, in Graham’s day, most information was easily available through “Standard Statistics”, the ancestor of S&P. Because companies were so much simpler, this information carried the analyst a long way to getting an advantage over those who didn’t know how to interpret the data.

When I started in investment analysis, in Rio de Janeiro in 1959, although there was no equivalent to S&P (until I set one up), companies were exceedingly simple and easy to understand. The terms and conditions of issuers were more or less standard. Companies had few, if any, subsidiaries. Most had a single line of business, like brewing beer or making cigarettes. A few ratios from the financial statement and a trip to visit the factory could give one a good understanding of the business and its prospects.

Today, the problem is exceeding complexity and the flood of non-standard terms and conditions that few have the patience to digest. Technical analysis is far more popular today than fundamental analysis and dominates most investment decisions.

Without help in collaborative research, it is difficult to attack the information tsunami alone. Because “toxic” details can be well buried among irrelevancies, it takes a lot of time to understand today’s opportunities. Some companies (like the big international banks) are so complicated that even top management doesn’t understand them. I know, because I’ve been in that position.

The idea that markets are efficient because of so much “free” information is simply not true. The information is not “free” at all — there is an enormous “time cost” of digging it out.

You mention the inner dynamics of leaderless organization must show that the ROI is positive for contributors. What Is the qualitative ROI for contributors to CMW? What about free riding? It’s a lot easier to sit back and wait for others to do the work. How can i incentivize others to do the work that’s important to me?

JS: This is really the key to whether CMW will be successful or not.

First of all, an analyst need not be afraid of “free riders”. (See: http://www.capital-market-wiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Help:Free_Riders). CMW does not provide “analysis”, opinions, or recommendations — only facts. To be able to judge the reliability of these facts, one has to be quite familiar with the workings of the encyclopedia. Also, information is spread over many articles, connected by a semantic network. Most casual readers won’t fully understand how this works unless they become editors. Finally, any “free rider” who really understands the encyclopedia will be tempted, now and then, to make a correction or addition — and will no longer be a “free rider”. Its not necessary to be a heavy-hitter analyst to make valuable contributions to a wiki. Just removing spam or vandalism, or correcting grammar or style is useful.

CMW also needs editors with many different skills — no one is expected to know everything. For example, one contributer might be a lawyer in Spain, another can translate from Mandarin to English, still another has information about the tax laws in New Zealand. Most editors of Wikipedia contribute only one article. Others only do little things, like clean up typos. However, with millions of editors, the results are astounding.

Furthermore, experience with Wikipedia indicates that active editors are more likely to cooperate and help other active editors. For example, if you are interested in a stock traded on the Jakarta Stock Exchange and there is an active editor on that topic, he or she is more likely to be willing to help you answer a specific question if you already have a “wiki reputation” as an active editor. CMW has special procedures to show one’s “wiki reputation”.

With regards to motivation, the CMW model presumes three target editors:

  • Educators: Academic professors and students.
  • Investors: People looking for information to guide investment decisions.
  • Entrepreneurs: People looking for opportunities to make money.

If you go to the wiki and follow the links from the first page, you’ll eventually get to a series of sub-systems that support these different target markets.

For example, most information in CMW is open source and can be republished and reconfigured without royalties. An entrepreneur may take this information, add investment advice and advertisements, and publish or sell the feed. The wiki provides a number of suggestions a how entrepreneurs can benefit from the wiki.

However, for entrepreneurs to benefit, they will need to help the wiki grow, either by helping to recruit academic or institutional patrons, or by recruiting editors. No wiki, no benefit to entrepreneurs.

CMW can also be used by financial institutions to outsource or home-source investment research, for a dramatic cost reduction. The basic idea is that is costs a lot less to hire a stay at home mom with a CFA in Boise, Montana than a Harvard MBA in New York City. CMW provides the templates needed to manage such out-sourced jobs (in fact, the same templates used by college professors to give assignments to students)

See: http://www.capital-market-wiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Help:Editor_benefits

For information on possible institutional use of CMW, see the article “Modern Technology for institutional investment research” (http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/modern-technology-for-institutional-investment-research.html)

You mention some parallel motivational worlds like finding jobs and promoting research firms. Can you elaborate? Seeking Alpha which is not collaborative but aggregates 3rd part content sees a lot of people marketing their own advisory firms via content, as well as creating a portfolio of work to raise money off of or find a job. Do you see this playing out as well on CMW?

JS: CMW is designed specifically to provide economic benefits to editors in a number of ways.

Because it is a semantic wiki, tied into Capital Market Taxonomy, it has been possible to set up a formal “job opportunity network”.

For example, if an editor specializes in translating articles from English into Japanese (CMW is multi-lingual), he or she can “advertise” this skill on his or her user page, placing the information in the semantic database. Then if someone else is looking for a person to translate a financial article from English to Japanese, they simple input this information on a form on their own user page and the name of the translator will appear. The employer may then check out the work of the translator on the wiki to see if its satisfactory and then contact the translator directly to offer an assignment.

There is also a formal system of “merit awards”. If someone thought that the translator above did a good job of translating from English to Japanese, they can go to that user’s “talk” page and give them a “merit award” which will be entered in the database. “Merit awards” are also a way to thank other editors for helping you on a job. On every article, you can see who did the most work and who, if anyone, earned “merit awards” for this work.

It is expected and hoped that editors of CMW gain economic advantage from participating in the wiki. In fact, here are some of the special systems (software modifications) that are specifically for this purpose: “merit awards”, “job opportunity network”, “patrons”, “RSS sub-pages”, “assignment templates”, “repackaging services”, and two sidebar links: “main contributors” and “prizes, services, jobs”.

The reference to “parallel worlds” is relative to the global scope of the encyclopedia. It is possible to have a highly developed encyclopedia with reference to the market in Hong Kong, with almost no entries with regards to the markets in Belgium. There can also be parallel worlds with regards to languages. CMW works off a single database and taxonomy, allowing different language versions of the same article to be referenced through the same database.

I’d like to know about governance and because you’re focused on investing with huge incentives to game the system, how your governance differs from Wikipedia’s.

In many ways, the governance of CMW is similar to that of Wikipedia. However, here are some of the major differences:

  • CMW formally encourages self-promotion (within limits), whereas Wikipedia actively discourages the practice.
  • CMW has formal, hard-wired systems to provide economic advantages to editors (like the job opportunity network) whereas Wikipedia has none.
  • CMW has formal, hard-wired “merit awards” that serve not only to help editors get jobs, but also as a peer review system. Wikipedia has informal “barn stars” unconnected to the database or any opportunity network.
  • If a small accounting firm in Chile were to place an article in Wikipedia, it almost certainly would be deleted within minutes. In CMW, as long as the information is factual, related to capital markets, and in the proper style and format, the article would be encouraged and allowed to enter the database.
  • A consulting firm specializing in, say, cotton derivatives, could write an encyclopedia article on this topic in CMW, placing a relevant RSS feed published by the firm on the subpage of the article. In Wikipedia, this is not possible nor permitted.
  • CMW has a policy of “Ethical Promotion”. Wikipedia’s policy is “no blowing your own horn.”

I’d like what you’re doing with taxonomy. Can you just explain why it’s so important and how this works?

JS: Articles in CMW are divided into four categories: Markets, Institutions, Operations, and Instruments. These groups are called “namespaces”.

For examples, there might be articles on Markets; United States; Institutions: NYSE; Operations: Insider Trading Rules (Indonesia); and Instruments: General Motors Common Stock (US)

Capital Market Taxonomy consists of formal, written definitions of what goes in each category.

For example, the definition for the namespace “Markets” is “legal jurisdictions within which capital markets exist.”

Each namespace is further broken down into sub-categories.

For example, the namespace “Markets” is broken down into “nation-state”, “sub-national entity”, “territory”, “monetary union”, “monetary and economic union”, and “status disputed”.

Capital Market Taxonomy consists of several thousand defined categories and other semantic forms.

However, an editor doesn’t have to know any more than the top four categories. When setting up a new article, there is a form on the sub-page that automatically classifies the article into the proper categories.

This makes it possible to find articles without knowing the exact name, simply by concept.

For example, you can make a list of all securities exchanges in Southeast Asia by conducting a semantic search.

All editors have a “private sandbox” (something than Wikipedia doesn’t have) where they can work on articles or set up private “tables of contents” or “working lists”. If you are researching articles about securities exchanges in Southeast Asia, a few lines of code in your “private sandbox” gives you a working table of contents with links to all articles in this category.

Of course, as the encyclopedia grows, far more sophisticated searches can be set up just as easily. For example, you might wish to make a list of all beer companies in Europe that have issued preferred stock or convertible debentures. Capital Market Taxonomy allows this to be done quickly and securely.

Furthermore, lists created in this way are automatically updated. If a new beer company appears in Europe with convertible debentures, it would automatically appear on your list.

Capital Market Taxonomy makes it possible for editors who do not know each other or perhaps even speak the same language, to find articles of mutual interest simply by concept.

Although Wikipedia uses categories, there is no taxonomy or documentation and the list of categories is in the several hundred thousands and virtually useless. CMW enforces taxonomy discipline in creating new categories and also has two other semantic forms: “attributes” and “relations”.

An important feature of Capital Market Taxonomy are the built-in outlines for over seventy types of articles. These serve as research guides, suggesting questions to be answered and the format of articles. Editors can set up an outline in a few minutes, appropriate to a specific topic. For example, one type of outline is available for “preferred shares” while another is available for “financial market regulators”. (See: “Recommended Formats at http://www.capital-market-wiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Help:Recommended_Format).

The best way to learn about Capital Market Taxonomy is to read the help files on the wiki (which are extensive) and then test out the system in your private sandbox.

Note: Although any reader can use the features of Capital Market Taxonomy, casual “free riders” may not even realize that the system exists. This suggests why active editors are more likely to benefit from CMW than the casual “free rider”.

Very interesting, but again, why is this so important to the future of collaborative, crowdsourced investment research?

JS: The primary purpose of Capital Market Taxonomy is to make the job of collaborative research easier and more efficient by introducing the concept of “every fact in its proper place”, reducing the “time-cost” of fact gathering.   In other words, the benefit is for editors primarily, rather than readers.

Taxonomy is not needed if an analyst is working alone, but if many analysts (who don’t know each other) are to work together efficiently, they need to have an prior understanding as to the purpose of the research and where the results are to be published.

Capital Market Taxonomy makes this more or less automatic in the process of setting up new articles, in filling out the form that creates the “InfoBox”, and in using the recommended formats for each type of article.

Wikipedia, for example, has no taxonomy whatsoever.  The result is duplication of articles, lack of standard formats and uncertainty as to whether someone has already written something about a certain topic.

See: “Articles to be merged” in Wikipedia, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Articles_to_be_merged), which shows over 14,000 articles in this category as of August 2009.  There is also another category for articles to be split up.

The goals of Capital Market Taxonomy are:

  1. Avoiding redundancy:  If there is only one proper place for each type of information, it is easier to avoid redundancy, or the need to subsequently merge, reorganize, or split up articles.  The recommended formats for articles contain advice popups on dividing topics into “generic” and specific articles, and on avoiding redundancy.
  2. Emphasizing completeness: When analysts work to a predefined outline of information that is to be included in the encyclopedia, missing material becomes more evident.  Capital markets have become so complex that often the “toxic” information that changes the nature of an investment is buried in some collateral topic that may not seem important.  For example, in analyzing common shares of closed end funds, it was easy to overlook the terms and conditions of the preferred shares of these funds.  This information was missing in most annual reports, 10-Ks, or in the easily available analyses of these issues.  However, auction rate preferred shares actually had terms that were highly prejudicial to common shareholders when the value of the fund portfolio fell beyond a certain point.   With Capital Market Taxonomy and the standard formats for articles, the lack of this information would be visible, reminding analysts that more research needed to be done.
  3. Facilitating contributions of specialists:  Everyone who works in capital markets today only has expertise in a small corner of the information universe.  Capital Market Taxonomy breaks the information universe down into orderly pieces so that specialists may more easily find articles that match their expertise.  For example, in the Operations namespace, there might be an article on Insider Trading Rules in Indonesia and another on the economic theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  In the Markets namespace, there might be an article on the Municipality of Naples, Florida, and another on Vanuatu.  Specialists in each  area can focus their attention on specific articles to the benefit of all users of the encyclopedia. The outlines for articles in the Instruments namespace contain sections for tax information, that can be left blank by those without knowledge of tax matters, to be filled out by others with this knowledge.

With Capital Market Taxonomy, editors are more likely to all work on the same page.  By collaborating with the aid of taxonomy, each researcher does less work and benefits more from the work of others.

Additional Resources


Interview with John Schroy, thought leader in collaborative investment research (Part 1)

I’ve been thinking a lot about collaborative research techniques, strategy, structure, etc. over the past couple of weeks.  I’ve written about Wikinvest’s wiki structure previously and generally like what they’re up to.

But look a little further, and there’s been little written, discussed, analyzed about the future of collaborative research when so much has been written about crowdsourcing, in general.  In a Wikipedia world, it’s amazing to think that the bull market we’re experiencing in investment research via blogs, expert communities, Screening 2.0, and crowdsourcing  technologies hasn’t spurred more towards open-source collaboration as it relates to investment research. I’ve mentioned Piqqem as a tool to plumb the wisdom of the crowds for investors but outside of some tools, there ain’t a whole lot going on.

Through the course of my probing a bit deeper, I stumbled upon John Schroy, a financial professional who’s become both an industry analyst and entrepreneur in the collaborative research space.  Below are the takeaways of some of my conversations with him.

First, I’d love to know a little about you, your background and what’s brought you this field.

John Schroy: I’m a retired banker and financial consultant. I’ve spent 33 years working in developing emerging capital markets — Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, and Indonesia in the 1990s. I retired in 2000 and continued working on research that I had started earlier with respect to Capital Flow Analysis. This led to the opening of capital-flow-analysis.com in October 2004. (see: http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/about/this_site.html). This is an educational, non-profit site.

By November 2007 I had become interested in the fact that the major financial statistical publishers (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, Bloomberg, etc.) had fallen far behind in the job of gathering, summarizing, and publishing fundamental data on the millions of security issues now traded in global markets. Furthermore, some of these publishers had become focused primarily on purveying opinions (e.g. bond, stock, and fund ratings), rather than serving as impartial sources of basic investment intelligence.

In the 1960s, I had founded and managed what was, at that time, the largest publisher of financial statistics in Latin America. I know the constraints of this business model. See: Serviço Nacional de Investimentos Ltda. ( http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/investment-tutorial/case_1t.html ). It seemed to me that a non-profit, wiki encyclopedia format (as in Wikipedia) might be an economical way to supply the need for more extensive factual, in-depth coverage of world capital markets.

With the Internet and Google, there is now far more undigested, raw, open-source information (OSINT) freely available than can be easily gathered and comprehended by the average investor. Even professional security analysts do not have the time to thoroughly research all the securities that they might wish to include in a diverse portfolio. With securities in foreign markets, the deficiency is severe. The challenge is how to transform this sea of raw information into reliable, actionable intelligence. The Crash of 2008 has provided a justification to return to hard research-based fundamental analytical methods.

I worked for two years creating the motivational and operational structure for Capital Market Wiki. The wiki was opened to the public in March 2009 without fanfare. My intention now is to approach professors of finance, business and economics at universities throughout the world, suggesting that they use Capital Market Wiki as a tool for teaching open source investment research techniques, while providing students with exposure that will help in placement on graduation. Professors would also have a platform for marketing their consulting services.

But first it is necessary to engage in publicity of the basic idea via articles in Capital Flow Watch — which is where I am at now. Capital Market Wiki is in the early proof of concept phase — a phase which I intend to keep open for at least five years. Wikis are notoriously difficult to get started and I expect going to be slow for an extended period. So far CMW does not have the academic and institutional patrons that it will need.

Capital Market Wiki (and most of the educational material on the Capital Flow Analysis website) is available under the creative commons license (i.e, its free to use as you see fit, if you cite the source).

You mention that there is a lack of motivation to conduct more collaborative research.  How do you see that and why do you think that is?

JS: This is a complex issue that requires an historical explanation, but I’ll try to be brief.

First, since SEC Rule 10b-18 of 1982 granted save harbor to corporations to buy back their own stock and the corporate governance movement provided cover for hired executives to be remunerated by stock options, equity buybacks have dominated the US equity market, forcing prices up for over a generation. (See: The Great Misleading at http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/investment-essays/buyback_fallacies.html). Prices exceeded earlier levels of rational value, but investors still appeared to be making money simply by investing in equity index funds, with no need for research.

Second, the popularity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis provided a theoretical basis for non-research based investing, such as through index funds. Modern Portfolio Theory adopts Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz’s measure of risk (past price volatility and betas) rather than fundamentals, with performance measured on relative rather than absolute terms. The negative effects of the Efficient Market Hypothesis could be seen in 2008 with the impact of mark-to-market rules on financial institutions. (See: Fallacies of the Nobel Gods at http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/investment-essays/nobel_gods.html)

Third, the rise of proprietary trading at financial institutions further emphasized technical analysis, rather than old-fashioned Ben Graham fundamentals. Institutions offered higher remunerations to traders, salesmen, and account executives than to long-term security analysts.

The amount that can be spent on fundamental research is limited by return on investment and customary levels of fund management fees. There are competing uses for this money, not the least of which are the remuneration of portfolio managers, marketing expenses, and the profit margin of the fund management company. I estimate that only about 1/100 of one percent of total market value of US stocks and corporate and municipal bonds is spent each year by Wall Street institutions on salaries and bonuses of financial analysts, according the US government figures. (See: The economics of security analysis at http://capital-flow-analysis.com/capital-flow-watch/post-modern-security-analysis-part-three-the-economics-of-security-analysis.html).

The Crash of 2008 was, in my opinion, a world-changing event of such significance that there is a possibility that fundamental research will again regain importance. However, more efficient methods of research than the old-fashioned “Standard & Poor’s” model are needed, which is where wikis and crowd-sourcing comes in.

You say no wiki has sufficiently addressed the necessary issues facing the investment field until you developed capital market wiki.  What about Wikinvest?

JS: As far as I know, Capital Market Wiki is the only vehicle designed for collaborative, fundamental research on world capital markets with strict encyclopedia standards.

What I seek to create is a factual encyclopedia of world capital markets that is free from opinion and that emphasizes truth and accuracy. The closest that any wiki comes to this model is Wikipedia, but this extremely successful wiki is not organized as a capital market encyclopedia.

When I first started to explore this idea, I thought that it might be possible to get something done through Wikipedia. However, I found that Wikpedia’s policies essentially made this impractical.

Wikipedia presents problems in dealing with raw financial research:

  • It has an over-riding policy regarding “Neutral Point of View” that requires editors to allow all points of view (i.e., opinions), rather than to present only what is true, avoiding opinion.

  • Policies regarding “reliable sources” and “no original research” essentially prohibit or restrict open source intelligence gathered from places such as SEC files.

  • There is a lack of a semantic structure or framework suitable for capital market information.

  • There is a policy of “notability” that excludes topics that are not yet “noteworthy”. This eliminates many small companies and even firms like that of Bernie Madoff (until after fraud is uncovered and the firm is notorious).

  • There is a large contingent of editors (the majority) with no expertise or interest in capital markets but who will eliminate and restrict contributions about this field for no good reason.

Wikinvest is not a semantic wiki, nor does it have strict policies regarding content consistent with the creation of a reliable source of factual information about capital markets. It is loaded with opinion (even having “bulls” and “bears” tabs on articles), and seems to duplicate much of the information available on Yahoo Finance. It also is clearly a commercial venture with distracting advertisements that raise questions regarding impartiality.

Marketswiki is also not a semantic wiki and seems to be restricted to derivative markets.

Piqqem is not an encyclopedia wiki but rather a system for crowdsourcing investment opinion.

Valuewiki is also supported by advertisements, similar to Yahoo Finance, and lacking in substantive original research. It is not structured as a semantic wiki.

Note: It seems to me that the non-profit aspect of the wiki itself is important, as has been the case for Wikipedia. Editors might be willing to donate their time for their own benefit, but not for the profit of others.

Stay tuned for part II of my interview with John Schroy where we’ll dig deeper into crowdsourcing investment research to learn more of the Capital Markets Wiki and the work/thought John has put into it to make it the go-to resource for publishing opinion-free investment content.  We’ll learn more about the taxonomy as well that Schroy has developed to make this work.

Additional Resources


Investment bank research dead? Hardly.

It’s a little to early to auger the demise of the investment bank research department.  Yes, they’ve lost their prestige and their ability to move stocks like butter.  Yes, independent, whisperbuy-side research firm Gerson Lehrman is rockin’.  Yes, we’re even beginning to see the early stages of free, collaborative research take hold here and here.

But to anyone who doubts the influence i-banks still retain, I invite you to read an article in today’s WSJ, “Goldman’s Trading Tips Reward its Top Clients“.

While we can debate the merits of providing tiered service to different types of Goldman clients until we get blue in the face, the message is clear: when a firm like Goldman gets incrementally more positive on a stock, they still have a way to make it go up.

According to the article, Goldman holds a weekly powow to determine both how to pitch certain ideas to clients and how to position proprietary firm accounts accordingly.  For Goldman Sachs, as the house, they win.  For clients, Goldman’s influence still means profits.

Every week, Goldman analysts offer stock tips at a gathering the firm calls a “trading huddle.” But few of the thousands of clients who receive Goldman’s written research reports ever hear about the recommendations.

At the meetings, Goldman analysts identify stocks they think are likely to rise or fall due to earnings announcements, the direction of the overall market or other short-term developments. Some of their recommendations differ from ratings printed in Goldman’s widely circulated research reports. Some Goldman traders who make bets with the firm’s own money attend the meetings.

Does it matter whether Goldman’s research is good? Not really.  It’s the firm’s backing and propagating ideas to clients that provide the real value.  It’s also what’s partially responsible for Goldman’s $3 billion + in net income it reported last quarter.  It’s also just interesting to note that in the article quoted from above, it didn’t appear that anyone made any real money on the Janus idea.  Point here, point there.

In addition to influencing trading, Goldman’s also raising the service levels and closeness brokers and analysts are providing to their hedge fund clients.  The WSJ article quotes a hedge fund analyst at Frontpoint who says that he appreciates the banter and finds it useful to hear both sides of a trade as part of a larger conversation.

Don’t count banks out.  Their influence comes in how well they can integrate their brokerage units with their prop trading desks to give a full, 360 degree view to the investing process.